Restructuring 101

The terms behind European restructurings, sourced to the statutes and judgments

A working glossary for the cases we cover. Each entry gives the definition, a real example from a European restructuring, and the primary text it comes from.

Who votes, and when a court can bind the ones who said no

Most of Europe rebuilt its restructuring law around the 2019 EU Restructuring Directive. These are the terms it introduced, with how they played out in Atos, Orpea and Celsa. The regime guide compares the national versions side by side.

Affected parties

The creditors, and where national law allows the shareholders, whose claims or interests a restructuring plan changes directly. Only affected parties vote. Anyone the plan leaves untouched gets no vote.

Example. Atos had three classes of affected parties, two of creditors and one of shareholders.

Source: Directive (EU) 2019/1023, arts 2(1)(2) and 9(2); Tribunal de commerce spécialisé de Nanterre, Atos judgment, 24 Oct 2024.

Equity holder

Anyone with an ownership interest in the debtor, such as a shareholder, to the extent they are not also a creditor. Member States may stop equity holders from voting at all.

Source: Directive (EU) 2019/1023, arts 2(1)(3) and 9(3)(a).

Best-interest-of-creditors test

No dissenting creditor may end up worse off under the plan than in a liquidation, or than in the next-best alternative if the plan fails. The court checks it only when someone challenges the plan on that ground.

Example. In Atos, the court-appointed expert put unsecured financial creditors’ recovery in a liquidation at 0% to 9.5%.

Source: Directive (EU) 2019/1023, arts 2(1)(6) and 10(2)(d); Atos judgment, 24 Oct 2024.

Class formation

Affected parties vote in classes, and each class needs “sufficient commonality of interest based on verifiable criteria”. At a minimum, secured and unsecured creditors vote separately.

Example. Celsa’s lenders had their classes confirmed by the Barcelona court before filing the plan (Sentencia 600/2022, 2 Dec 2022). Orpea’s classes were challenged up to the Versailles Court of Appeal (22 Jun 2023, n° 23/03276).

Source: Directive (EU) 2019/1023, art 9(4) and (5); Cuatrecasas note on Celsa, 20 Sep 2023.

Cross-class cram-down

A court can confirm a plan that some classes voted against, as long as a majority of voting classes approved it, including at least one secured class or one class senior to ordinary unsecured creditors. Failing that, it needs at least one in-the-money class other than equity.

Example. Orpea’s plan passed in 6 of 10 classes and was imposed on the rest by the Nanterre court on 24 Jul 2023. Atos never needed it, because all three classes cleared two thirds.

Source: Directive (EU) 2019/1023, art 11(1)(b); Orpea company release, 24 Jul 2023; Atos judgment, 24 Oct 2024.

Relative priority rule

The EU default. A dissenting class has to be treated at least as well as any class of the same rank and better than any junior class. Juniors can still get something while seniors are not paid in full.

Source: Directive (EU) 2019/1023, art 11(1)(c).

Absolute priority rule

The US rule, and an option Member States can choose instead of relative priority. A dissenting class has to be paid in full before any junior class receives or keeps anything. Member States may carve out exceptions where a plan needs them and they do not unfairly prejudice anyone.

Source: Directive (EU) 2019/1023, art 11(2).

No class paid more than its claim

Under the Directive’s cram-down conditions, no class can receive or keep more than the full amount of its claims or interests.

Source: Directive (EU) 2019/1023, art 11(1)(d).

Interim and new financing

Money lent during or for the restructuring, protected so it cannot be unwound or attacked in a later insolvency. Member States may also rank it ahead of other creditors.

Example. Atos drew €225m of interim financing on 15 Jul 2024. Celsa’s court treated bilateral lines drawn after 31 Oct 2022 as interim financing.

Source: Directive (EU) 2019/1023, art 17; Atos judgment, 24 Oct 2024; Celsa Sentencia 26/2023, operative part.

Restructuring expert (experto en la reestructuración)

In Spain, creditors can ask the court to appoint one, and the court can give the expert power to carry out the plan for a debtor that refuses to.

Example. In Celsa, Lexaudit was appointed on 29 Sep 2022 and later authorised to sign the restructuring documents for the shareholders.

Source: Texto Refundido de la Ley Concursal, art 672; Celsa Sentencia 26/2023, operative part.

English plans turn on the relevant alternative

Part 26A plans have become the tool of choice for European groups with English-law debt. Three Court of Appeal decisions, Adler, Thames Water and Petrofac, now set the rules.

Restructuring plan (Part 26A)

The English court process, added to the Companies Act 2006 in 2020, where a company in financial difficulty proposes a compromise with its creditors or members, they vote in classes, and the court decides whether to sanction it. A class approves when 75% in value of those present and voting agree. Unlike a scheme of arrangement, there is no headcount test, and the court can impose the plan on a class that votes it down.

Example. Adler, Thames Water and Petrofac.

Source: Companies Act 2006, Part 26A, ss.901C and 901F; Kington S.a.r.l. v Thames Water Utilities Holdings Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 475, paras 29 to 33.

Practice statement letter

The letter a plan company sends creditors before the first court hearing, explaining the plan, the proposed classes and the hearing date, so anyone who objects to the class split can raise it early.

Example. Thames Water sent its letter on 22 Nov 2024, ahead of the convening hearing.

Source: Re Thames Water Utilities Holdings Ltd [2024] EWHC 3310 (Ch).

Convening hearing and sanction hearing

A Part 26A plan goes to court twice. At the convening hearing the judge decides the classes and orders the creditor meetings. At the sanction hearing, after the votes, the judge decides whether to approve the plan, including any cram-down.

Example. Thames Water was convened by Trower J on 17 Dec 2024 and sanctioned by Leech J on 18 Feb 2025.

Source: [2024] EWHC 3310 (Ch); [2025] EWHC 338 (Ch).

Cross-class cram-down (English plans)

The court can sanction a plan over a dissenting class if two conditions are met. Condition A: no member of the dissenting class would be “any worse off than they would be in the event of the relevant alternative”. Condition B: the plan was approved by 75% in value of a class that “would receive a payment, or have a genuine economic interest in the company, in the event of the relevant alternative”. Meeting both gives the court a discretion, not a duty.

Example. Thames Water’s Class B creditors voted 15.5% in favour and the plan was still sanctioned.

Source: Companies Act 2006, s.901G, quoted in [2025] EWCA Civ 475, para 34.

Relevant alternative

Whatever the court thinks “would be most likely to occur in relation to the company if the compromise or arrangement were not sanctioned”. It is the yardstick for Condition A and decides which classes count as in the money for Condition B. It is often an insolvency, but not always: in Thames Water the dissenters argued the real alternative was a different restructuring plan.

Source: Companies Act 2006, s.901G(4), quoted in [2025] EWCA Civ 475, para 34.

Out of the money (genuine economic interest)

A class that would get nothing in the relevant alternative. The court can exclude such a class from voting at all if “none of the members of that class has a genuine economic interest in the company”.

Example. Thames Water chose not to ask for this against its Class B creditors.

Source: Companies Act 2006, s.901C(4), quoted in [2025] EWCA Civ 475, paras 31 and 32.

Fair allocation of the benefits of the restructuring

Even when Conditions A and B are met, the court asks whether the value the plan creates, over and above the relevant alternative, has been shared fairly, including with the classes being crammed down.

Example. The Court of Appeal set out the test in Adler and applied it in Petrofac, where it set aside the sanction because the plan gave too much of that value to the creditors putting in new money.

Source: Re Adler Group SA [2024] EWCA Civ 24; Re Petrofac Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 821.

Scheme of arrangement

The older English tool: a compromise between a company and its creditors, approved at a class meeting and sanctioned by the court. Each class needs a majority in number representing at least 75% in value of those voting. Once sanctioned, the scheme binds every member of the class, dissenters included. There is no cross-class cram-down: every class has to approve. For debt restructurings the scheme is now mostly the implementation vehicle once support is already there, with the Part 26A plan reserved for cases that need to bind a dissenting class.

Example. Arxada implemented its amend and extend with a scheme under Part 26. The secured class voted 97.2% in favour and the unsecured class 99.8%, and no class had to be crammed down.

Source: Companies Act 2006, Part 26, ss.899 and 901.

No automatic stay

An English plan comes with no statutory moratorium. Creditors can enforce, and insolvency petitions can be filed, while the plan is negotiated and promoted, so restructuring groups buy breathing room with standstill agreements written into the restructuring support agreement instead. A company that needs a formal stay applies separately for a moratorium under Part A1 of the Insolvency Act 1986, subject to conditions including a monitor’s statement. The contrast with Chapter 11 is sharp: the US stay is automatic, and worldwide.

Source: Insolvency Act 1986, Part A1; compare the automatic stay described under Chapter 11 below.

France runs a ladder of procedures, most of it before the court

French law sorts its toolkit by how distressed the company is and who asks. The two pre-insolvency procedures are confidential and consensual. The collective procedures open when the company can no longer pay its debts as they fall due, the point French law calls cessation des paiements. Most large bond restructurings have run through the safeguard family rather than the redressement; the class and cram-down mechanics shared with the EU directive tools are set out under Votes and classes above.

Mandat ad hoc

The lightest tool. The debtor asks the president of the commercial court to appoint a neutral practitioner, the mandataire ad hoc, to help it negotiate with creditors. The procedure is confidential, with no classes, no voting and no moratorium, and the debtor stays in control. A mandat ad hoc can be converted into a conciliation at any time.

Source: Code de commerce, arts L.611-3 and L.611-4, via Légifrance.

Conciliation

The debtor asks the president of the commercial court to open the procedure and appoint a conciliator. The mission runs no more than four months, extendable to a maximum total of five. The aim is a consensual accord with the creditors. If the accord is court-approved (homologué), new cash contributed to implement it is paid by privilege ahead of other claims in a later insolvency, which is one reason conciliation is used to line up new money before a collective procedure opens.

Source: Code de commerce, arts L.611-6 and L.611-8, via Légifrance.

Sauvegarde

The collective procedure for a company that faces difficulties it cannot overcome but is not yet in cessation des paiements. Only the debtor can ask for it. The court opens the procedure, appoints an administrator and supervises the preparation of a plan, which creditors vote on in classes under the same mechanics set out under Votes and classes above.

Source: Code de commerce, art L.620-1 et seq., via Légifrance.

Sauvegarde accélérée

The accelerated track of safeguard, opened with a plan already negotiated in a conciliation: the court decides on opening on the conciliator’s report. It is reserved for companies above the size thresholds in art L.628-1 (250 employees with €20m of net turnover, or €40m of turnover), and the company must stay out of cessation des paiements for at least 45 days after opening. The plan is approved under art L.626-31.

Example. Atos opened on 23 Jul 2024 and had its plan approved on 24 Oct 2024, three months later.

Source: Code de commerce, arts L.628-1 and L.626-31, via Légifrance.

Redressement judiciaire

The collective procedure for a company in cessation des paiements that still has a realistic chance of being reorganized. The debtor, a creditor or the public prosecutor can ask for it. The court appoints an administrator whose aim is a continuation plan or a sale of the business; failing both, the case moves to liquidation.

Source: Code de commerce, art L.631-1, via Légifrance.

Liquidation judiciaire

The end of the ladder: the company is in cessation des paiements and its recovery is clearly impossible. The court appoints a liquidator who realizes the assets and distributes the proceeds in the statutory order.

Source: Code de commerce, art L.640-1, via Légifrance.

Chapter 11 sorts creditors by impairment

European companies with US assets or dollar debt still use Chapter 11. SAS is the worked example here.

Impaired and unimpaired (Chapter 11)

An unimpaired class keeps its rights, is presumed to accept and does not vote. Impaired classes vote. A class that gets nothing is deemed to reject.

Example. In the SAS plan, the Swiss bonds, the state-held hybrid bonds and the existing shares were all deemed to reject.

Source: Joint Chapter 11 Plan of SAS AB, ECF No. 1784, Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 22-10925, s.3.2.

Convenience class

A class of small claims paid a fixed cash amount so the debtor does not have to handle thousands of tiny distributions.

Example. SAS Consortium creditors with claims of US$1.499m or less were expected to get 10% in cash at emergence.

Source: SAS Chapter 11 Plan, ECF No. 1784 (Class 6); SAS release, 5 Feb 2024.

Cram-down (Chapter 11)

Under section 1129(b) of the US Bankruptcy Code, a court can confirm a plan over the objection of an impaired class if the plan does not discriminate unfairly against it and is “fair and equitable”, which for unsecured classes means the absolute priority rule.

Example. SAS’s plan was confirmed this way on 22 Mar 2024 over the classes that voted against or were deemed to reject, including the Swiss bonds, the state hybrids and the old shares.

Source: 11 U.S.C. s.1129(b); Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order confirming the Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of SAS AB, ECF No. 2347, Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 22-10925.

Distribution record date

The cut-off for who receives plan distributions. Anyone holding a claim at that date gets paid. Later buyers do not.

Example. SAS set 13 Aug 2024 for most claims, with a separate date (expected 15 Aug 2024) for its commercial hybrid bonds.

Source: Notice of entry of order confirming plan, Swedish court approval and distribution record date, ECF No. 2956, Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 22-10925, 6 Aug 2024.

Exchange offer (out of court)

The main out-of-court tool when face debt far exceeds asset value: creditors are offered new securities per unit of old debt, for example new bonds plus new shares for each bond held. Old equity ends up diluted, sometimes to a fraction of one per cent, but is almost never expunged consensually. The mix of new debt and equity is negotiable, and all-equity structures often suit firms with unstable cash flow and make new money easier to raise.

Example. Moyer’s worked example: bonds with $700 face trading at 41 receive $140 of new bonds plus 10 new shares per bond, leaving $100 of new debt at par and old equity diluted to 1.7 per cent.

Source: Moyer, Distressed Debt Analysis: Strategies for Speculative Investors (J. Ross Publishing, 2003), ch 4 (pp 53-56).

Bondholder committee

An informal, self-appointed group of bondholders with no membership rules, no fiduciary duties and no vote of its own. Its legitimacy rests on the share of the issue its members hold, and managements rarely deal with committees holding under about 25 per cent. Member motives can conflict: a strategic member may want to buy equity cheap and press for liquidation to capture cash, while a defensive member such as a mutual fund wants to avoid showing a loss.

Source: Moyer, Distressed Debt Analysis: Strategies for Speculative Investors (J. Ross Publishing, 2003), ch 4 (pp 57-59).

Prenegotiated, prepackaged and free-fall

Three filing postures. A prepackaged plan is voted on by creditors before the petition is filed. A prenegotiated plan is negotiated before filing and voted on after. A free-fall means filing with no deal in place, a warning sign of a one to three year fight. Filing itself is tactical: filing before a missed interest payment helps control the venue and avoids an involuntary petition.

Source: Moyer, Distressed Debt Analysis: Strategies for Speculative Investors (J. Ross Publishing, 2003), ch 4 (pp 70-75).

Automatic stay and postpetition seniority

The filing freezes creditors in their prepetition positions. Claims arising after the filing are effectively senior to most prepetition unsecured claims, which is why trade, employees and the estate’s professionals get paid through the case. The filing date also sets the valuation date for collateral for certain purposes and stops interest accruing on unsecured and undersecured claims unless the debtor is solvent.

Source: Moyer, Distressed Debt Analysis: Strategies for Speculative Investors (J. Ross Publishing, 2003), ch 4 (pp 71-72).

DIP financing, priming and roll-up

Chapter 11 lets the debtor borrow new money with priority over previously encumbered assets. Priming an existing secured lender requires protecting it adequately, so prepetition lenders often become the DIP lenders themselves, and a roll-up folds prepetition debt into the new loan. The company keeps operating as a fiduciary of its creditors; authority beyond the ordinary course of business needs court approval.

Source: Moyer, Distressed Debt Analysis: Strategies for Speculative Investors (J. Ross Publishing, 2003), ch 4 (pp 76-80).

Bifurcation and deficiency claims

A secured claim is capped at the value of its collateral and the shortfall becomes an unsecured deficiency claim. A second lien can be treated as entirely unsecured where the first lien already exceeds the collateral value. Unsecured claims can be combined or split into separate classes to shape recoveries, and creditors with different aims (trade wanting cash, funds wanting equity) may elect different classes.

Source: Moyer, Distressed Debt Analysis: Strategies for Speculative Investors (J. Ross Publishing, 2003), ch 4 (pp 73-76).

Exclusivity (Chapter 11)

The debtor’s exclusive right to propose a plan, for 120 days from the filing and extendable in good faith. Creditors who wait out the period lose the ability to put forward their own plan while the debtor controls the process.

Source: Moyer, Distressed Debt Analysis: Strategies for Speculative Investors (J. Ross Publishing, 2003), ch 4 (p 74).

Substantive consolidation and structural subordination

Two structural levers on who recovers what. A court can consolidate the estates of group entities into one pool. Separately, a creditor of a parent company is structurally subordinated to creditors of the operating subsidiaries that actually own the assets, even though both hold debt in the same group.

Source: Moyer, Distressed Debt Analysis: Strategies for Speculative Investors (J. Ross Publishing, 2003), ch 4 (p 76).

What a bond price implies about the business

The valuation machinery behind the case studies: the framework from Moyer’s Distressed Debt Analysis and Koller, Goedhart and Wessels’ Valuation, with the distressed-market adaptations both books spell out. Ideas that come from US practice are labeled as such where it matters; the mechanics entries above are already Chapter 11, which Europe treats as a comparison, not a template.

Market-value framework

The market values a firm from the outside in. Only the equity price is directly observable, so the asset value is imputed from the quoted claims: assets equal market liabilities plus market equity. Every bond and share price therefore implies a total asset value, and the analyst’s job is to reverse it out.

Example. Moyer’s Boxco: a firm worth 100 in the market framework is read as 80 of debt and 20 of equity, whatever the accounting statements say.

Source: Moyer, Distressed Debt Analysis: Strategies for Speculative Investors (J. Ross Publishing, 2003), ch 3 (p 42).

Distress pricing and the cross-security inconsistency

Near the bottom of the structure, bonds trade in cents on the dollar, and the implied values do not always reconcile: senior paper at 50 and equity positive is consistent, but subordinated paper at 20 alongside positive equity is not. Explanations include option value, short-sale limits, tax-loss selling, recoveries backed by director-and-officer insurance, or simply that the market is wrong. The inconsistency is where the opportunity sits, which is why the framework matters more than the precise number.

Source: Moyer, Distressed Debt Analysis: Strategies for Speculative Investors (J. Ross Publishing, 2003), ch 3 (pp 46-48).

Enterprise value (EV)

Enterprise value equals equity value plus total debt plus preferred plus minority interest, minus excess cash. Adjusted (split-coupon and PIK) paper enters at accreted value rather than face: take the trading price as a percentage of accreted value and rebuild the claim that way.

Source: Moyer, Distressed Debt Analysis: Strategies for Speculative Investors (J. Ross Publishing, 2003), ch 5 (pp 102-105).

EBITDA, and its limits

EBITDA is net income plus taxes, interest and depreciation and amortization. It exists for comparability across firms with different capital structures and tax positions. Its limits matter in distress: it ignores working-capital changes and capital expenditure, it can be flattered by one-time add-backs, and covenant definitions often deviate from the accounting version, so a covenant EBITDA and an analyst’s EBITDA can differ materially in the same year.

Source: Moyer, Distressed Debt Analysis: Strategies for Speculative Investors (J. Ross Publishing, 2003), ch 5 (pp 93-100).

Rent capitalization (EBITDAR)

An owner-operator and a renter with identical operations show different EBITDA because rent sits in selling, general and administrative costs. Capitalizing the rent at roughly 7 to 11 times and comparing EBITDAR, or rent-adjusted EBITDA, puts them on the same footing.

Source: Moyer, Distressed Debt Analysis: Strategies for Speculative Investors (J. Ross Publishing, 2003), ch 5 (pp 95-96).

The EBITDA multiple approach

A discounted cash flow is theoretically correct but hostage to projections, so practitioners price with a multiple of EBITDA. Financial buyers pay about 4 to 6 times, driven by leverage, amortization and required returns; strategic buyers pay about 7 to 8 times with synergies. Distressed situations often trade below both, and that gap is the opportunity.

Source: Moyer, Distressed Debt Analysis: Strategies for Speculative Investors (J. Ross Publishing, 2003), ch 5 (pp 93, 106-109).

Back-solving enterprise value from a traded price

Read the market’s implied valuation the other way round: take the traded price of the debt, work out the enterprise value it implies for the whole structure, and compare it with what comparable companies would support. Moyer’s example: a target with a 5 per cent margin trades at 3.4 times EV against peers at 4.8 to 7.4 times, narrowed to 5.5 to 6.0 times on the closest comparable. At 5.5 times, the bonds are worth about 40 against a market price of 25, with the upside and the margin of safety both reading off the same numbers.

Source: Moyer, Distressed Debt Analysis: Strategies for Speculative Investors (J. Ross Publishing, 2003), ch 5 (pp 109-111).

Why book value of debt fails in distress

Valuing debt at its book value is a convenient proxy that stops working exactly when default becomes a live possibility, which is the distressed case. At high default probability the market value of debt sits well below par, so every claim in the framework has to be taken at market.

Source: Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies (Wiley), ch 5 (4th ed, pp 101-121).

Continuing value: the key value driver formula

For the continuing value at the end of a forecast, the key value driver formula ties growth to returns explicitly: continuing value equals next year’s after-tax operating profit times one minus the ratio of growth to return on new invested capital, divided by the spread of the cost of capital over growth. Growth only creates value when returns on new capital beat the cost of capital, and the formula makes that condition impossible to hide.

Source: Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies (Wiley), ch 12 (3rd ed, pp 267-288).

WACC assumes a stable capital structure

The standard weighted average cost of capital discounts the firm as a whole on the assumption that the debt-to-value ratio stays roughly stable. A restructuring is precisely the period when that assumption fails, which is why adjusted present value is the better tool there: value the business as if unlevered, then add or subtract the financing effects, including the tax shields and any distress costs, one by one.

Source: Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies (Wiley), ch 5 (4th ed, pp 101-121) and ch 10 (3rd ed, pp 201-232).

Economic profit

Value equals invested capital plus the present value of future economic profit, where economic profit is after-tax operating profit minus a charge for the capital employed. The result is identical to the discounted cash flow, which Koller proves in the appendices, but the split shows how much of the value is simply the capital already in place and how much is created above the cost of capital.

Source: Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies (Wiley), ch 3 (4th ed, pp 47-68) and appendices A and B (4th ed, pp 693-699).

ROIC and growth drive the multiple

Two firms with identical earnings and identical growth can carry 10 times and 15 times multiples when their returns on invested capital differ. Value comes from returns and growth together, and growth at returns below the cost of capital destroys value no matter how the revenue chart looks.

Source: Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies (Wiley), ch 3 (4th ed, pp 47-68).

The liability management toolkit, and the protections built against it

Before a case reaches a court, creditors and sponsors fight over the capital structure itself. The techniques below move collateral or voting power inside the structure. They were built in the US market and are labeled as US comparisons; European deals meet them regularly, which is why they sit next to the court tools above.

Liability management exercise

The umbrella term for out-of-court transactions that restructure inside the capital structure without a court: dropdowns, uptiering, new facilities that swing votes, exit consents. Whether one works turns on the documents and on whether the votes can be assembled; English law adds an outer limit, the abuse principle described under exit consents below.

Source: White & Case, “Legitimate coercion or unlawful abuse? Assénagon and the power to bind the minority in liability management exercises revisited” (2022).

Using basket capacity under the restricted payments covenants, the company transfers assets, often intellectual property, to subsidiaries outside the restricted group, then issues new debt there secured by those assets, ahead of the existing lenders’ collateral pool. The technique takes its name from the 2016 J. Crew transaction.

Example. Aston Martin’s £550m of new secured debt led by HPS in July 2026 released the brand IP out of the 2029 bondholders’ security into new Cayman subsidiaries that do not guarantee their notes.

Source: J. Crew credit agreement baskets (2016); Aston Martin company announcements, July 2026.

Uptiering

A majority of the secured lenders amends the credit agreement to permit new priming debt, then exchanges its existing loans into that new debt. Non-participating lenders stay behind, subordinated to the new paper. A US technique (US comparison); the exchange offer litigations around Serta Simmons in 2020 made the technique widely known.

Source: Serta Simmons first lien credit agreement amendments, 2020; the technique is a US one, cited here as a comparison.

Vote rigging

The company issues a new tranche of debt to cooperating lenders so that, with the new holdings, they form the majority needed to approve amendments the existing lenders would have blocked. It requires debt capacity under the existing covenants.

Example. Revlon in 2020 used new revolving facilities taken by cooperating lenders to swing the majority of its 2016 term loan behind a dropdown and an exchange.

Source: Revlon credit agreement amendments, 2020; a US technique, cited here as a comparison.

A consent that participants in an exchange must also give to amend the old notes against the holdouts, typically by stripping covenants or enabling the redemption of the remaining notes at a nominal price. In the Assenagon case, Briggs J held that a majority resolution used to redeem the non-participating notes at 0.00001% of face value was an abuse of the majority power: the court will not aid a vote whose purpose is to expropriate the minority for a nominal consideration.

Source: Assenagon Asset Management SA v Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd [2012] EWHC 2090 (Ch); White & Case (2022).

J.Crew and Serta blockers

Covenant protections drafted into European deals to close the paths above: bars on transferring material IP or other assets to non-guarantor or unrestricted entities, and limits on issuing priming debt without the consent of lenders who cannot participate in it.

Example. Arxada’s cleansing presentation to lenders listed a Pfleiderer-style anti-LME protection, which 9fin described as a first for a European deal, alongside Omni, J.Crew, Envision, Chewy and Serta blockers.

Source: Arxada cleansing presentation to lenders, 12 May 2026; 9fin, Pfleiderer protections, 20 May 2026.

Sacred rights and the agreement among lenders

The terms a credit agreement or indenture protects with all-lender or affected-lender consent rather than a simple majority: maturity, margin, security release and pro rata sharing. In a bilateral or small club deal that gives each lender veto-level rights, and in private credit the lenders often also contract among themselves, under an agreement among lenders, on how they will vote, an instrument the borrower may never see.

Example. Arxada’s amend and extend needed every SFA lender plus 90% of the secured notes and 90% of each unsecured series to change terms consensually; a scheme needed only 75% of the secureds.

Source: Herens facilities agreement and notes amendment thresholds as set out in the Arxada cleansing presentation, 12 May 2026.

Unrestricted subsidiary designation

The covenant mechanism by which a group moves a subsidiary outside the restricted group: the issuer designates the subsidiary as an Unrestricted Subsidiary, its guarantee terminates, its collateral is released, and its cash flow stops supporting the notes. The designation is treated as an Investment equal to the fair market value of the subsidiary's net assets, so it has to fit inside the restricted payments baskets, typically a leverage test. The guarantee terminates on designation only if the designation was made in accordance with the indenture, and the same condition governs the collateral release, so a designation outside the baskets releases nothing.

Example. Altice Portugal and Altice Caribbean were designated Unrestricted Subsidiaries on 28 November 2025 in Project Déjà Vu, taking out the two businesses that generated about 80% of the restricted group's adjusted EBITDA. The GoldenTree complaint pleads that the designations breached the 4.0x leverage test, so the guarantees and liens remain in force.

Source: 2020 Indenture of Altice Financing (22 January 2020), ss.1.01, 4.05(b)(17), 10.06(b)(2) and 11.05(a)(3), as pleaded in GoldenTree 2004 Trust and GTAM 110 DAC v Altice Financing S.A. and others (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed 10 Nov 2026). A US technique, cited here as a comparison.

Change of control put

The right of each holder to require the issuer to repurchase its notes at 101% of principal when a change of control triggering event occurs. The trigger usually needs two things at once: a change of control, which can include a disposition of all or substantially all of the issuer's and the restricted subsidiaries' assets, and a rating decline within the trigger window.

Example. The GoldenTree complaint pleads that moving Altice Portugal outside the restricted group was itself a change of control, and that S&P's downgrade of the Altice Financing senior secured notes from CCC+ to CCC on 5 December 2025, within seven days of the designation, completed the triggering event.

Source: 2020 Indenture of Altice Financing (22 January 2020), s.4.03 and the definitions of change of control and change of control triggering event, as pleaded in the same complaint.

Creditor litigation: unwinding the transfers

When a borrower moves value out of the creditors’ reach, the answer is not always a plan vote. Two families of action do the unwinding: the Luxembourg revocatory actions and their New York cousin.

Actio pauliana (Luxembourg)

The revocatory action of article 1167 of the Luxembourg Civil Code, which lets a creditor challenge an act by which its debtor fraudulently impairs its rights and have it declared unenforceable against the creditor, inopposable. Four elements: a certain and liquid claim that arose before the challenged act; an impoverishment of the debtor that jeopardizes its solvency or the creditor's recovery; the debtor's knowledge, actual or constructive, of the prejudice; and, for acts made for consideration, the counterparty's knowledge of that prejudice. For gratuitous transfers no proof of the counterparty's knowledge is required. The remedy does not unwind the act in rem; it makes it unenforceable against the attacking creditor.

Example. The three New York complaints against the Altice group plead the actio pauliana against the intercompany loan transfers, cancellations and the Project Déjà Vu transfers, each gratuitous as pleaded.

Source: Luxembourg Civil Code, art 1167, as pleaded in GoldenTree 2004 Trust and GTAM 110 DAC v Altice Financing S.A. and others (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed 10 Nov 2026).

Action oblique (Luxembourg)

The action of article 1166 of the Luxembourg Civil Code by which a creditor exercises its debtor's own rights against third parties where the debtor declines to exercise them and the failure harms the creditor. In a group it is the route by which a creditor of an operating company reaches transfers made higher up the chain, by suing on the claims its debtor holds, or should hold, against its parent.

Example. The GoldenTree complaint pursues the Altice France Transfer and the OXG Transfer, both made by Altice Luxembourg, derivatively under the action oblique, because Altice International, controlled by the same managers, has not sued its own parent.

Source: Luxembourg Civil Code, art 1166, as pleaded in the same complaint.

Faute détachable (Luxembourg)

The separable fault standard under which a manager of a Luxembourg company is personally liable to a third party, including a creditor of the company, for fault committed outside the normal exercise of corporate functions. A fault committed knowingly, with awareness of the harm to the company's creditors, qualifies. The statutory companion is article 441-9(2) of the law of 10 August 1915 on commercial companies, which makes managers jointly and severally liable to third parties for damage caused by violations of that law or the articles. The underlying fault liability sits under articles 1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code.

Example. The GoldenTree complaint names eight directors and Patrick Drahi personally under these provisions, pleading that each knowingly stripped a guarantor of its assets for the benefit of its parent, with no fairness opinion and no independent financial advisor's letter.

Source: Luxembourg Civil Code, arts 1382 and 1383; Luxembourg law of 10 August 1915 on commercial companies, art 441-9(2), as pleaded in the same complaint.

Distribution of fictive dividends (Luxembourg)

The criminal offense under article 1500-6 of the 1915 companies law of causing dividends or interest to be distributed to shareholders that are not taken from actual profits. The penalty is a jail term of one month to two years and/or a fine of €5,000 to €125,000. In civil pleadings it marks the line on distributable capacity: a distribution above the reserves is not merely voidable, it is a crime.

Example. The GoldenTree complaint pleads that Altice Luxembourg's distributable reserves stood at about €140 million at year-end 2023 and about €42 million in 2024, while intercompany advances of €256 million net and €413 million went out in those years.

Source: Luxembourg law of 10 August 1915 on commercial companies, art 1500-6, as pleaded in the same complaint.

Fraudulent transfer (US comparison)

The New York Debtor and Creditor Law analogue of the revocatory action. An actual fraudulent transfer (s.273(a)(1)) needs intent to hinder, delay or defraud, proven through badges of fraud: transfers to insiders, overlapping control, inadequate consideration, concealment, backdating. A constructive fraudulent transfer (ss.273(a)(2) and 274) needs no intent: the debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value and was insolvent, left with unreasonably small capital, or intended to incur debts beyond its ability to pay. Remedies: avoidance and restoration; a money judgment against the transferee and, under s.277(b), against anyone for whose benefit the transfer was made; an injunction against further transfers under s.276(a)(3)(i); fees under s.276-a. The reach-back is four years under s.278(a), with a one-year discovery rule. Luxembourg's actio pauliana is the closest European cousin; the US action avoids the transfer in rem, while the pauliana makes it inopposable.

Example. All three New York Altice complaints plead the New York statute alongside the Luxembourg revocatory actions over the same intercompany loan structure, pleading both intent and insolvency on the same facts.

Source: New York Debtor and Creditor Law ss.273, 274, 276, 276-a, 277(b) and 278(a), as pleaded in the same complaint.

Some of the money is made in the plumbing

Terms from the financing and trading side of distressed credit.

Netback

A fund takes over a bank’s undrawn revolver or delayed-draw term loan commitment in the secondary market, usually by participation, and the bank pays the fund a nonrefundable net-back payment. It typically passes through a share of the upfront commitment fee, pro rata to the term left: on KPMG’s example, a fee of $100x with half the term gone gives a $50x net-back. The fund keeps the payment and any ticking fees even if the line is never drawn. Banks do it to free up capital tied to undrawn lines.

Source: Tompkins and Ritter (KPMG), “Unraveling the Timing and Character of Revolver Net-back Payments”, Journal of Taxation of Financial Products (2025).

Banks fail under their own regime

The tools above are for companies. Banks are resolved under the Banking Act 2009, which gives the Bank of England, HM Treasury and the Prudential Regulation Authority a special resolution regime with its own objectives and its own insolvency procedures. The collapse of SVB UK in March 2023 is the worked example.

Special resolution regime

The framework in Part 1 of the Act for a bank that is failing, or likely to fail. The Bank of England can exercise its stabilisation powers only if the bank is failing or likely to fail, no action will stop that, using the powers is necessary in the public interest of the special resolution objectives, and winding the bank up would not achieve those objectives as well. The objectives include the continuity of banking services, the stability of the financial system, public confidence, the protection of public funds and the protection of depositors covered by the FSCS.

Source: Banking Act 2009, Part 1, ss.4 and 7.

Stabilisation options

Five options: transfer the bank or part of its business to a private sector purchaser, to a bridge bank controlled by the Bank of England, to an asset management vehicle, to temporary public ownership, or bail-in, which writes down or converts the bank’s liabilities to restore it to solvency. Before any of them, the Bank of England must ensure the bank’s own capital instruments are cancelled, transferred, diluted, reduced or converted first, the mandatory conversion mechanism.

Example. SVB UK was transferred to HSBC on 13 March 2023 under the private sector purchaser option, after the Bank had said on 10 March that it intended to apply to put the bank into the bank insolvency procedure.

Source: Banking Act 2009, ss.6A, 6B and 10; Bank of England statement, 13 March 2023.

Bank insolvency procedure

The special insolvency procedure for banks. The court makes a bank insolvency order under Part 2 of the Act and a bank liquidator winds the bank up, aiming to return FSCS-protected deposits, up to £85,000 per eligible depositor, quickly, while achieving the best result for the creditors as a whole. The parallel rescue route is the bank administration procedure, where a bank administrator seeks a better result for creditors than liquidation would give.

Source: Banking Act 2009, Part 2, ss.96 and 97 and Sch. B2; ss.143 and 144 for the bank administration procedure; the SRR code of practice.

The reading list starts with the texts that shaped the field

Worked explainers come next

Longer pieces with real numbers from our cases: finding the fulcrum security, a full recovery waterfall, reinstatement math, getting from cents on the dollar to yield, rights offerings and backstops, and how a trading desk actually talks. Glossary terms will link from the case summaries. The glossary keeps growing as the reading continues: the rest of Moyer and the rest of Leveraged Finance feed the next entries.

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